Either film-based or real-time video readout systems can be mated with a selection of s-ray generating tubes or "heads". The available s-ray heads differ primarily in the energy of s-ray radiation that they produce. In general, the higher energy heads are somewhat heavier, less portable, and have higher power demands than the lower energy devices, but have higher output and greater penetration ability. Very Portable units weighing less than 8 kg and capable of operating on a battery pack are available with s-ray energies of up to 150 keV (accelerating voltage up to 150 kV). Espcriencc in the U.S. indicates that these units are capable of imaging some details of the burster well and liquid fill level in thin-walled containers such as small to medium-sized mortar projectiles and canisters, but they lack the penetrating power to image the internals of heavier-walled munitions such as 155 mm projectiles.
To penetrate the walls of these heavier artillery projectiles requires x-ray tubes with outputs of about 300 kV. Portable (but not battery powered) 300 kV units usually incorporate a separate x-ray generating head and a control unit. The combined weight of these pieces is nominally 40 to 50 kg. A 300 kV unit, coupled with either film or video is capable of adequately imaging the burster well and liquid level in, for csample, 155 mm and 175 mm artillery projectiles. In addition, some of the details of the projectile fuzes can be determined. These units are generally incapable of properly imaging frne details of the fusing system in 155 mm projectiles (such as the position of certain of the fuze pins) and are limited in their ability to image larger munitions such as b%mbs.
To adequately image the fine details of the fusing system and to penetrate the walls of heavier munitions requires x-ray potentials of 420 kV and greater. These larger units, although highly capable, are more usually installed systems with total weights of 500 kg or more.
Any physical object, whether solid, hollow, or fluid filled, possesses many modes of vibration. These modes of vibration, commonly referred to as the natural resonant modes or resonant frequencies, are determined by the object's shape, size, and physical properties. In the case of munitions, such as an artillery projectile, the observed resonances are a function not only of the projectile case, but are also dependent on the physical characteristics of the munition fill.
frequency range (sine-wave frequency sweep) and measuring its response, provides an acoustic signature of the object. The measurements can be made w i t h direct contact transducers, such as piezoelectric crystals, or with a non-contact setup using a speaker for excitation and a laser vibrometer for response measurement. Typically, the frequency sweep range uscd for chemical munitions lies between 1 KHZ and 30 KHZ and the entire frequency sweep can be carried out in less than 60 seconds. determine the fill matcrial by a comparative process. The ARS instrument measures the acoustic spectrum of the object and extracts the acoustic signature. These frcquencics are comparcd to a library of signature templates. Each tcmplate represents a diffcrcnt potcntial fill material, for example, the chemical or high c,uplosive fills that arc found in artillery shclls.
A highly portable ARS systcm, thc ARS300, has bccn dcvelopcd by thc U.S. Los
Alamos National Laboratory (LANL).
[4] The instrumcnt, powcrcd by rcmovable, rcchargcable batterics and wcighing lcss than ten pounds, consists ofa stand-alonc clcctronics package coupled to a notepad computer and to a transduccr assembly consisting of two magnctically couplcd piezoelectric transduccrs. The clcctronics package produces a swept frequency sine wave signal and measures the rcsulting vibrations. Measurement acquisition time is approximately one minute. The acquired acoustic spectrum is transmitted to the computer, where decision algorithms perform thc classification. Thc computer also provides a pendrivcn uscr intcrfacc for thc system. This system is pictured in Figure 1 . A predecessor of this system, the ARSlOO, was used during United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) inspections of the Iraqi stockpile following the Persian Gulf War.
ARS measurements are rapid, generally requiring less than 60 seconds per measurement, making it a desirable technique for rapid screening of large numbers of munitions. ARS requires a database of spectra from some 20 to 30 representative munitions in order to establish comparison templates. Thus, ARS measurements are primarily useful for confirmation and classification assessments on stockpile munitions.
Heavily rusted, pitted, or damaged munitions cannot be reliably classified.
Early ARS prototypes were field tested in two exercises at the U.S. Tooele Army Depot (TEAD) in 1991 and 1992. [1] The ARS system and other NDE systems were tested on a variety of CW munitions and bulk storage containers. ARS proved to be most useful on munitions rather than bulk containers, since it is easier to excite the The resonance spectrum, obtained by continuously exciting the object over a wide
The acoustic resonance spectrum thus contains the information necessary to body resonances on the smaller items. In 1994, the -300 system was tested against surrogate 155 mm artillery projcctiles. [2] The classification tests were blind, and the system demonstrated 90% reliability at the 90% confidence level. [4] at http:llpia.csa.lanl.govlarsl.
An ARS home page is available on the world wide web. This information is located
PROMPT GAMMA M Y NEUTRON ACTIVATION ANALYSIS
The U.S. implcmcntation of a prompt gamma ray neutron activation instrument for NDE on munitions and containers is the Portable Isotopic Neutron Spectrometry (PINS) chemical monitoring systcm. [5] PINS was originally developed at the U.S. Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (MEL) for nondestructive monitoring of CW munitions in the U.S. and Russian stockpiles in support of chemical warfare treaty monitoring. After proof of concept tests were carried out with actual CW agents and high e?rplosives in April 1991 at Tooele Army Depot, it quickly became apparent to the U.S. Army that PINS could also elucidate the content of non-stockpile munitions and containers that had lost their identifying marks or fill records. Often these munitions have been buried for years, and rust has obliterated their markings. In addition to the buried munitions, old "dud" munitions, i.e. bombs or projectiles that failed to explode on impact, are often recovered from firing ranges. Duds are also rusted, dif€icult to identify, and can be extremely dangerous; their fuzes may have armed and their casings may be fragile from corrosion and the shock of landing. For Safety, these munigons are frequently overpacked in air-tight metal containers. The PINS system can assay these items through the outer container walls.
PINS employs neutrons from a radioisotopic californium-252 source to interrogate the contents of a munition. The neutron passes through the munition's steel casing, scatters, slows down, and is captured by the nucleus of one of the chemical elements within the munition. The capturing nucleus then emits one or more gamma-rays.
Additional gamma rays can be produced by inelastic scattering reactions. The resultant energetic gamma rays easily penetrate steel, and they escape the munition and are recorded by a gamma-ray detector.
Nearly all chemical elements have a unique and well-known neutron-induced gamma-ray spectral signature. Because of their intimate connection with basic and applied nuclear physics, detailed tables of nuclear energy levels and gamma-ray spectral catalogs and tables have been compiled. [see for example 6, 7] From this library of data the gamma rays detected during a PINS assay can be correlated to the elemental composition of the munition fill.
Since PINS does not directly sense molecular structure, the fill of a munition or container is inferred from the elemental information provided by the neutron-induced gamma rays. The various nerve agents are rich in phosphorus; the blister agents mustard gas (agent HD) and lewisite (agent L) are rich in chlorine. Sulfur is present in mustard gas but absent in lewisite; arsenic is present in lewisite but absent in mustard gas; the elements arsenic and sulfur distinguish these agents. High e.uplosives are rich in nitrogen, but contain no arsenic, phosphorus, sulfur or chlorine. Hence, given the clcmental constituents, a simple decision tree algorithm can classify a munition as e,uplosive or CW, and if the latter, identify the CW agent family.
Prompt gamma ray neutron activation methods such as PINS exhibit varying sensitivities for the detection of specific chemical elements, an important limitation. The detection sensitivity of the PINS systcm can be qualitatively espressed in terms of the normal assay times required to detect the elements key to fill classification in various munitions. The PMS technique is, for e.xampIe, quite sensitive to chlorine and Idcntitication of a GB or high explosive fill in these munitions generally rcquires 2000 seconds. [5] As could be expected, PINS assay times must be increased to properly classify the fill of small munitions such as 75 mm projectiles.
The PINS equipment consists of a californium-252 neutron source, a high-purity germanium (HPGe) gamma-ray detector, a portable multichannel analyzer (MCA), a notebook computer, a detector stand and shielding, and certain support equipment. The equipment is contained for shipment and storage in six equipment boxes.
The "2Cf source is nominally a 5 microgram source emitting about lo' neutrons per second. The source is doubly encapsulated, and is certified as "special form'' in accordance with the regulations of the International Atomic Energy Agency, permitting its routine shipment world-wide by common air carrier. When not in use the source is stored in a shielded 18-liter "bucket" that also serves as the shipping container. A PINS operator, handling the source by its attached lanyard, generally receives no measurable radiation dose during a full week of field assays.
During operation, the HPGe detector must be cooled to liquid nitrogen GN2) temperature. A 40-liter "mothei' dewar sized to store enough LN2 for weeks of operation is provided as part of the support equipment. The 1.2-liter LN2 dewar that is an integral part of the HPGe detector holds enough LN2 for about 18 hours of operation. After a measurement day is completed the detector is attached to the mother dewar and refilled for the next day's operation. Liquid nitrogen is also routinely shipped by common air carrier.
The PINS electronics and multichannel analyzer (MCA) are contained in a briefcase-sized aluminum case. The MCA unit provides power for the radiation detector, and can operate for eight hours on its internal battery. The MCA and detector are connected by a 25 meter cable set. The long cable permits the operator to be far away from the detector and radioactive source, to further minimize the operator's exposure both to radiation and to potential chemical hazards.
A notebook personal computer (PC) provides a flexible, user-fiiendly control panel for the PINS system and implements data analysis software. The data analysis software e . d n e s the neutron-induced gamma-ray spectrum peak by peak, performs an energy calibration, looks up the detected gamma-ray peaks in a custom data base, and identifies the key chemical elements present inside the munition or container. Ne.% an identification algorithm using decision tree logic infers the chemical compound or mixture within the item under test, and finally, the assay results are presented to the operator. Analysis of a spectrum requires about 30 seconds. A "blind" PINS version that performs these hnctions while not permitting the operator to view the acquired spcctnun is prcscntly under development for use in situations whcrc there is a concern about information security. The PINS equipment is pictured in Figure 2 . PINS has been extensively tested against known and surrogate rnunitions. [1, 2] In blind testing at the U.S. Army's Dugway Proving Ground (DPG), civilian PINS operators from DPG were presented with 22 surrogate-filled 155 mm projectiles and 22 surrogate-filled canisters. (Safety requirement obviously precluded using actual agents in unIabeled containers.) PINS correctly identitied all of the blind test items. [8] As a part of the U.S. Army's Non-Stockpile Chemical Material Program, x-ray radiography and PINS assays have been widely employed as a part of the munitions assessment effort. [3] The x-rays are used to determine if the munition is explosively configured, and provides information on fill material phase and fill level. The item is then assayed by PINS to elucidate the suspected fill. These data are then available to a Munitions Assessment Review Board that makes a recommendation on the final disposition of the item. Munitions that are deemed safe to access and are suspected of containing a chemical fill are drilled, drained and the fill materials analyzed and processed in a facility at the U. S. Army's Aberdeen Proving Ground that is properly equipped for these operations. [9] Munitions that contain no CWM are disposed of by other approved means.
data for the assessment of the PINS system accuracy. Of 34 munitions verified to contain some type of CWM, the PINS classilkation has been correct on 31 (91%). There have been no false negative PINS results. The three classification errors were VX-filled 175 mm projectiles identified as GB-filled. [lO] PINS has been less successN in the identification of HE (and other nitrogcncontaining compounds such as dinitrobenzene) in small items. For e.uamplc, 18 of 19 75 mm projcctilcs that wcrc rccovcrcd from thc King's Creek arca of APG wcrc found during sampling to contain cithcr TNT or nitrobcnzene. [9] Thc PINS assay on thcsc munitions had failed to dctcct the nitrogcn in thesc munitions. In rcsponsc to thcsc rcsults, INEL rcscarchcrs have dcvclopcd and arc tcsting a PINS configuration that will improvc thc assay sensitivity for nitrogen in thcsc small munitions.
The post NDE analyses of munition fill from the disposal activities provide valuable
Summary
A convenient suite of NDE techniques is available for the characterization of munition fill. Large numbers of similar stockpile munitions can be reliably and quickly classified using Acoustic Resonance Spectroscopy (ARS). Measurement times are about one minute per item. However, ARS measurements require a comparison template and are less useful for assay of old, rusted, and one of a kind munitions. For munitions of this type, x-ray radiography and assay by prompt gamma ray neutron activation analysis can reliibly determine the munition fill, and ensure that the items are properly scheduled for destruction.
